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ABSTRACT 
 
Retailers gather data about customers’ online behavior to develop personalized 
service offers. Greater personalization typically increases service relevance and 
customer adoption, but paradoxically, it also may increase customers’ sense of 
vulnerability and lower adoption rates. To demonstrate this contradiction, an 
exploratory field study on Facebook and secondary data about a personalized 
advertising campaign indicate sharp drops in click-through rates when customers 
realize their personal information has been collected without their consent. To 
investigate the personalization paradox, this study uses three experiments that confirm 
a firm’s strategy for collecting information from social media websites is a crucial 
determinant of how customers react to online personalized advertising. When firms 
engage in overt information collection, participants exhibit greater click-through 
intentions in response to more personalized advertisements, in contrast with their 
reactions when firms collect information covertly. This effect reflects the feelings of 
vulnerability that consumers experience when firms undertake covert information 
collection strategies. Trust-building marketing strategies that transfer trust from 
another website or signal trust with informational cues can offset this negative effect. 
These studies help unravel the personalization paradox by explicating the role of 
information collection and its impact on vulnerability and click-through rates. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Retailers use sophisticated, personalized marketing strategies that exploit consumer 
data to influence purchase decisions (Hawkings 2012), so much so that these data 
have become the “life-blood of retail” (National Retail Federation n.d., p. 20). Many 
online retailers partner with publishers such as Google and Yahoo that collect 
consumer data, then use the collected information to present personalized 
advertisements (Angwin 2012). In addition, with the spread of social networking 
sites, retailers—which represent the largest sector of Internet advertising spending, 
accounting for 22% in 2011 (Interactive Advertising Bureau 2012)—have entered 
into these media spheres to present consumers with more targeted advertising. 
Facebook thus became the most popular ad publisher in 2011, with a 31.2% market 
share (comScore 2011), but also has come under close scrutiny of its advertising 
practices and covert data collection methods (Singer 2010). These trends suggest the 
need for retailers to find more sustainable methods of data collection and use 
(McCann Worldwide 2011). 
 Advocates of covert data collection techniques contend that the consumer 
benefits from them, because the data collection does not disrupt their online surfing 
experience (Milne, Bahl, and Rohm 2008), whereas granting consent to each data 
collection encounter would force users to take 2.5 times longer to complete online 
tasks (Interactive Advertising Bureaux Europe 2011) and disrupt the flow of their 
shopping (National Retail Federation n.d.). Yet consumers may experience discomfort 
when they receive personalized advertisements (Tucker 2012), because it prompts 
them to realize their information has been collected without their consent. For 
example, when the U.S. retailer Urban Outfitters launched a website that personalized 
each customer’s experience by gender, customers instantly recognized the 
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personalization and confronted the clear knowledge that the retailer had collected 
their information without their awareness. They reacted by accusing Urban Outfitters 
of being “too close for comfort” and making illegitimate uses of their data, which 
quickly led Urban Outfitters to abandon the personalization strategy (Singer 2012). 
Thus, despite evidence that response rates improve with greater personalization, such 
efforts also could increase consumer discomfort, leading to lower response rates. This 
phenomenon gives rise to what we refer to as the personalization paradox: 
Personalization can be both an effective and an ineffective marketing strategy, 
depending on the context. The effects of various data collection methods on this 
paradox remain unclear, though retailers using online advertising could benefit from 
recommendations about which tools or marketing communication to use to avoid or 
minimize the negative effects of personalization. 
Current research offers little guidance; it mostly emphasizes consumers’ 
reactions to the delivery of personalized services (Sundar and Marathe 2010; Tam and 
Ho 2006), without accounting for the information collection process needed to 
personalize services or consumers’ reactions. Literature on covert marketing practices 
provides some insights though. For example, Miyazaki (2008) studies disclosures of 
the use of cookies, a common covert information collection technique, and finds that 
when consumers realize a cookie is going to be installed (e.g., after notification on 
web browsers) but receive no prior disclosure in privacy statements, they exhibit 
lower behavioral intentions toward the website. Although personalization can signal 
greater relevance and increase customer adoption (Tam and Ho 2006), no research 
indicates whether it triggers negative reactions similar to those prompted by an 
explicit cookie notification (Miyazaki 2008).  
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Furthermore, research that addresses the mechanism underlying negative 
reactions to data uses tends to rely on cognitive reasoning, such that customers weigh 
the pros and cons of allowing firms to use their data (Awad and Krishnan 2006). Yet 
in many cases, consumers form attitudes quickly, instinctively, and without in-depth 
thinking, in reaction to a stimulus (Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999). Such affective 
responses strongly influence retail shopping experiences (Arnold and Reynolds 2009) 
and consumer judgments (Avnet, Pham and Stephen 2012). Milne, Bahl, and Rohm 
(2008) suggest that consumers may experience an affective sense of vulnerability in 
response to covert information collection, but empirical tests of this proposition or its 
implications for consumer behavior are lacking. In addition, customers likely accept 
feelings of vulnerability in environments marked by trust (Urban, Amyx, and 
Lorenzon 2009), and various retailer-driven marketing strategies seemingly might 
increase customer trust (Bart et al. 2005; Kim and Kim 2011; Pan and Zinkhan 2006). 
Such trust-building strategies in turn might offset the negative reactions brought about 
by feelings of vulnerability.  
This article seeks to make three main contributions. First, using evidence from 
exploratory field studies on Facebook and secondary data, we corroborate the 
existence of the personalization paradox and probe the interdependencies among the 
collection and use of data for personalization and their impact on consumer behavior 
in social media settings. This effort represents a response to calls for more empirical 
generalizations related to personalization strategies in retailing (Grewal et al. 2011). 
With new insights into the personalization paradox, we find that employing covert 
data collection undermines the beneficial impact of increased relevance on advertising 
effectiveness. Second, we conceptualize consumers’ perceived vulnerability as a 
negative influence on the experience of personalization in social media–mediated 
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environments. Drawing on psychological ownership theory, we propose that 
vulnerability occurs when personalization provokes discomfort, because the consumer 
comes to a sudden realization of the covert data collection. This conceptualization 
offers an affective alternative to the common cognitive rationale for low click-through 
rates on online ads, namely, as due to privacy concerns. In turn, we operationalize 
consumer vulnerability with a newly developed, robust, five-item measure and 
validate its impact on advertising effectiveness. Third, we test the impact of two trust-
building strategies—transferring trust from the media context or signaling trust with 
cues—that may offset the experience of vulnerability. If the personalized 
advertisement appears on a trustworthy website, its credibility can mitigate the 
negative effect of covert data collection. Similarly, information icons that 
systematically inform customers about how their information is being collected and 
used provide trust-building cues that can reduce the negative impacts of covert data 
collection. 
 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
Personalization 
 Personalization refers to a customer-oriented marketing strategy that aims to 
deliver the right content to the right person at the right time, to maximize immediate 
and future business opportunities (Tam and Ho 2006). The strength of this strategy is 
that it requires a minimum amount of effort by the customer, who relies mostly on the 
marketer to identify and meet his or her needs (Montgomery and Smith 2009). This 
central aspect of personalization provides a stark contrast with customization, which 
occurs when the consumer specifies the elements of his or her preferred marketing 
mix (Arora et al. 2008).  
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 Firms routinely practice personalization, both offline and online. In face-to-
face service encounters, firms encourage employees to adjust their behaviors toward 
each customer, such as referring to a customer by name or modifying the service 
offering to accommodate customers’ needs (Shen and Ball 2009). The applicability of 
personalization expands significantly in online environments too. Search engines, 
such as Google and Yahoo, can refine each user’s search results by incorporating 
prior search information; online retailers, such as Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble, 
provide personalized recommendations based on collaborative filtering, that is, on a 
user’s similarity to other users and their preferences (Montgomery and Smith 2009). 
Online advertisers also issue behaviorally targeted advertisements, reflecting a user’s 
online behavior (Goldfarb and Tucker 2011).  
 This ability to incorporate users’ past behaviors also enables online firms to 
personalize services more accurately, with advantages for both the firms and their 
customers. Briefly, customers enjoy improved products and services, a better 
preference match (Vesanen 2007), reduced cognitive overload, and convenience 
(Ansari and Mela 2003). Firms can better service their customers, which increases 
customer satisfaction (Rust and Chung 2006) and loyalty (Ansari and Mela 2003), and 
better manage customers’ perceptions of their responsiveness (Song and Zinkhan 
2008). Moreover, they might gain competitive advantages (Murthi and Sarkar 2003), 
charge higher prices (Vesanen 2007), and improve their profitability (Rossi, 
McCulloch, and Allenby 1996; Zhang and Wedel 2009). In an online advertising 
context, firms also benefit from greater recall, higher content evaluations, and more 
purchases (Tam and Ho 2006), such that personalized advertisements appear twice as 
effective as similar, impersonal versions (Tucker 2014). 
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Murthi and Sarkar (2003) specify three personalization stages: learning, 
matching, and evaluation. In the learning stage, firms collect and analyze customer 
data to understand their needs and preferences. The matching stage involves applying 
this information to personalize a customer’s experience; for our study context, it 
implies presenting a customer with a personalized advertisement. Finally, evaluating 
the effectiveness of the personalization strategy demands consideration of the learning 
and matching stages. In online settings, this last stage translates into evaluating the 
effectiveness of the personalized strategy with measurable instruments, such as click-
through rates. 
Because personalization inherently involves adapting to customer needs, it is 
essential for firms to learn about customers. The strategies that firms employ to 
collect such data differ in the degrees to which consumers are aware of how and when 
their information gets collected. We thus delineate two data collection strategies: 
overt and covert (Murthi and Sarkar 2003; Sundar and Marathe 2010).  
Information Collection 
When firms engage in overt information collection strategies, consumers 
know their data are being collected (Sundar and Marathe 2010), because the firm has 
made a conscious effort to inform them. The underlying assumption is that continued 
use of the services, after this information provision, creates an ad hoc consent to the 
data collection. For example, The Economist’s website clearly informs readers about 
its use of cookies; an information box appears in the header of each page 
(www.economist.com). Privacy advocates stress the importance of information 
transparency and consent, but practitioners tend to argue that excessive consent 
requests could be detrimental to consumers’ surfing experiences (Interactive 
Advertising Bureaux Europe 2011). For example, the “irritating” nature of the Dutch 
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“cookie law” led to suggestions to rescind the requirement that websites obtain 
permission from visitors to use cookies every time they visit a site (DutchNews.nl 
2013).  
Covert information collection strategies instead occur when firms collect data 
without consumers’ awareness, often by unobtrusively gathering information while 
the consumer browses the Internet (Milne, Bahl, and Rohm 2008; Montgomery and 
Smith 2009). The unobtrusiveness of this form of data collection helps the firm gain 
unbiased data, and thus a richer customer understanding that it can use to tailor its 
services (Verhoef et al. 2010). It also benefits consumers, by not interfering with their 
surfing experience. Because consumers are not informed of each discreet instance of 
information collection, the ad hoc consent assumed in overt information collection 
settings cannot apply (John, Acquisti, and Loewenstein 2011). Consumers’ demands 
for more openness thus pose a challenge to firms that prefer to continue to practice 
covert strategies (Turow et al. 2009). 
Link Between the Personalization Paradox and Information Collection 
Personalization requires the collection and use of consumer data to make 
inferences about their preferences (Montgomery and Smith 2009). Although Internet 
users generally realize that firms, such as social networking sites, collect their 
information, they often become aware of these discreet instances only if the firm 
overtly informs them that it is doing so. When firms do not inform their customers 
about their data collection efforts, an advertisement that contains distinct, personal 
information may cue customers that their information has been collected, without 
their consent. Milne, Bahl, and Rohm (2008) suggest that exposure to such cues 
results in negative customer reactions and thus to harms to the firm’s reputation and 
future business. For example, customers might perceive that the firm is acting in its 
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own self-interest, which would lower their perceptions of its benevolence and value 
offering (Shen and Ball 2009). We expect the effect of personalization on consumers’ 
click-through intentions to be moderated by their awareness of the collection of 
personal data. Moreover, the positive benefits of personalization should accrue when 
the firm engages in overt, as opposed to covert, information collection.  
H1:  When firms engage in overt information collection, more personalized (cf. less 
personalized) advertisements enhance click-through intentions, but not when 
firms engage in covert data collection. 
 
Cognitive Theories 
Two literature streams related to privacy and reactance seek to explain the 
negative consequences of personalization using cognitive approaches. First, 
investigations of privacy feature various considerations, including the importance of 
regulatory and parental interventions for limiting underage disclosures (Lwin, 
Stanaland, and Miyazaki 2008) and the effects of privacy on retailer quality 
perceptions (Wolfinbarger and Gilly 2003). The application of privacy theories to 
explicate personalization outcomes often emphasize the trade-off between the benefits 
of personalization and the costs of privacy. In this cost–benefit analysis, consumers 
act as rational economic agents, who consider both the risks and benefits prior to 
disclosing their information and form perceptions of the personalized service (Awad 
and Krishnan 2006; Chellappa and Shivendu 2010; John, Acquisti, and Loewenstein 
2011; Pavlou 2011). This rational assessment and deliberate decision process suggest 
that sharing private information is a cognitive, rather than affective, concept. 
Second, personalized messages can lead users to perceive threats to their 
freedom, in terms of their ability to avoid being closely observed by a firm (Brehm 
1966). In response to this threat, customers may exhibit reactance and attempt to 
reattain their restricted freedom (Fitzsimons and Lehmann 2004). In light of this, 
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White et al. (2008) find that higher levels of personalization are less effective if 
customers receive no justification for why their information has been used. Building 
on this finding, Tucker (2014) shows that introducing privacy controls increases the 
effectiveness of personalized advertisements by reducing reactance. Reactance 
“describes a strategy that consumers use to avoid complying with a persuasion 
attempt but does not directly characterize the cause of discomfort associated with a 
privacy invasion” (Tucker 2012, p. 2). Therefore, we turn to psychological ownership 
theory and describe an affective process that might explain the discomfort and 
ultimately the paradox.  
Psychological Ownership and Vulnerability as an Affective Alternative 
Psychological ownership is a state in which a person has a sense of ownership 
over external objects (Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks 2001), because of his or her strong 
cognitive and affective attachment to them (Avey et al. 2009). These owners then 
perceive a right to gain information about the objects and a voice in decisions that 
affect them (Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks 2001). Violations of these expectations 
produce strong negative emotions; removal of the possessed objects causes people to 
feel acute loss, such that they may be “personally annihilated” (James 1981, p. 280) or 
sense a loss of self (Belk 1988).  
Vulnerability arises when consumers lack of a sense of control over the 
situation and experience a state of powerlessness, brought about by marketplace 
imbalances (Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg 2005). Consumers may feel vulnerable if 
firms engage in certain actions that make them feel exploited (Andreasen, Cooper-
Martin, and Smith 1994). Such an experience is marked by strong emotional intensity, 
caused by the acute threat to their self-concept, such that the individual even could 
feel as if her or his security and well-being were at risk (Baker, Gentry, and 
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Rittenburg 2005; Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks 2001). In contrast with cognitive theory–
based predictions, feelings of vulnerability emerge subconsciously and may be hard to 
express, despite their strong impact. Research also indicates that this feeling of 
vulnerability may shape privacy concerns, which suggests the potential relationship 
between these constructs (Bandyopadhyay 2009; Dinev and Hart 2004).  
When customers recognize covert information collection, through exposure to 
highly personalized advertisements, they likely perceive a loss of control and 
experience feelings of vulnerability. Vulnerability is highly undesirable, so consumers 
avoid objects associated with it. In contrast, when customers receive details about 
information collection strategies prior to their exposure to highly personalized 
advertisements, they are less likely to perceive a loss or experience feelings of 
vulnerability, because they have granted implied consent, through their awareness. 
We thus posit that the influence of personalized advertisements on consumers’ click-
through intentions depends on their awareness that personalization is taking place. 
When consumers become aware of covert information collection only through their 
exposure to a highly personalized advertisement, they sense greater vulnerability and 
express lower click-through intentions in response to highly personalized 
advertisements; when they are exposed to overt information collection, they do not 
experience feelings of vulnerability and indicate greater click-through intentions. 
H2:  When firms engage in covert information collection, more personalized (cf. 
less personalized) advertisements increase feelings of vulnerability, but not 
when firms engage in overt data collection. 
 
 
Trust-Building Strategies 
Trust, as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based on positive expectations of the intentions or behaviors of another” 
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(Rousseau et al. 1998, p. 395), is especially important online, due to the vast 
information asymmetries and customer uncertainty inherent to the Internet (Stewart 
2003). For example, consumers cannot ascertain how retailers use information about 
their shopping behaviors on websites. Without any means to determine whether a firm 
is acting in their own best interests, consumers may remain unwilling to grant firms 
more control over the interaction (Bart et al. 2005; Urban, Amyx, and Lorenzon 
2009). Online advertisers therefore pursue various strategies, such as relying on a 
particular website’s credibility or using signaling cues, to build more trust in their 
advertisements, which then should improve click-through rates. 
Online advertisers can take advantage of a trustworthy website by capitalizing 
on the potential spillover of trust from the website to an advertisement. Consumers 
tend to believe that advertisements follow the norms of the websites on which they 
appear (Stewart 2003), so if a web surfer trusts a particular website, he or she likely 
assumes that the assurances and safeguards related to the site also pertain to the 
advertisements on the site. In turn, they are more likely to accept a sense of 
vulnerability to trustworthy websites (Pavlou, Liang, and Xue 2007). If such websites 
feature highly personalized advertisements, we expect that consumers accept this 
form of vulnerability, despite the covert data collection, and exhibit higher click-
through intentions than they would in response to an advertisement on an 
untrustworthy website. That is, we predict that vulnerability decreases click-through 
intentions only if consumers are exposed to highly personalized advertisements on an 
untrustworthy website. 
H3:  When firms engage in covert data collection, more personalized 
advertisements decrease click-through intentions if the advertisement appears 
on a less trustworthy (cf. more trustworthy) website, due to their increased 
feelings of vulnerability.  
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Alternatively, firms might seek to increase consumer trust through cues that 
signal their benevolence and reliability (Kim and Kim 2011). The Internet 
Advertising Bureau UK (2011) urges firms to incorporate icons to inform users about 
data collection and usage practices; such icons could increase trust perceptions (Pan 
and Zinkhan 2006), benevolence and integrity beliefs (Schlosser, White, and Lloyd 
2006), and behavioral intentions (Wang, Beatty, and Foxx 2004). When advertisers 
incorporate icons directly into an advertisement, consumers may experience more 
trust and become more willing to accept vulnerability, such that they will click on a 
highly personalized advertisement that contains a trust-building cue, despite their 
recognition of covert data collection attempts by the firm. 
H4:  When highly personalized advertisements contain trust-building cues, click-
through intentions do not differ whether the information has been collected 
overtly or covertly.  
 
 To establish empirical evidence of the predicted personalization paradox, we 
undertook an exploratory field study on Facebook (Prestudy 1) to demonstrate the 
differential effects of personalization. We also gathered secondary data about a 
personalized advertising campaign (Prestudy 2) that attributed the decrease in 
effectiveness to covert information collection. As in-depth analyses, we conducted 
three experimental studies: Study 1 examines the impact of the interaction between 
information collection and personalized strategies on click-through intentions, 
revealing a central role of vulnerability in reducing the effectiveness of 
personalization. In Study 2, we investigate whether website credibility can offset the 
negative effects of vulnerability, and in Study 3, we consider the effectiveness of the 
industry-advocated solution of incorporating information icons into the advertisement. 
 
PRESTUDY 1 
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 A field experiment on Facebook provides some insights into the 
personalization paradox. Retailers often sell both services and products, so for this 
field experiment on Facebook, we selected a brand in each category: a well-known 
financial services brand and a familiar dog food brand sold in the Netherlands. The 
experiment featured three advertisements. The first contained no personalization; the 
second was moderately personalized, targeting people who indicated that they liked 
financial services or dogs; and the third was highly personalized, with content that 
reflected both liking of financial services or dogs and the participants’ demographic 
characteristics (i.e. age, gender, location). The advertisements ran for five days on 
Facebook, during which we collected the aggregated click-through rates (CTR).  
Results 
The results for the financial services brand showed significant increases in 
CTR when participants received more relevant advertisements, reflecting their 
indicated preferences (CTRno_personalization = .017%, CTRmoderate_personalization = .077%; z = 
-4.61, p ≤ .001). However, when participants received a targeted advertisement with 
specific personal information, the CTR significantly decreased (CTRmoderate_personalization 
= .077%, CTRhigh_personalization = .032%; z = 3.15, p = .002; see Figure 4.1, Panel a). 
Similar findings emerged for the dog food brand, with significant CTR increases from 
no to moderate personalization (CTRno_personalization = .047%, CTRmoderate_personalization = 
.064%; z = -1.38, p = .084, one-tailed) but significant decreases from moderate to 
high personalization (CTRmoderate_personalization = .064%, CTRhigh_personalization =.033%; z = 
2.60, p = .009, two-tailed; see Figure 4.1, Panel b). 
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Figure 4.1  
Pre-Study 1: Click-Through Rates  
 
a. Financial Services  
 
b. Dog Food  
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Discussion 
 These findings offer evidence of the personalization paradox. Observing 
consumers’ behaviors in the real world, we find that they react differently to 
advertisements with varied personalization levels. Some personalized advertisements 
are effective, but others fail to induce desired behaviors, such as clicking on the 
advertisement. The realization that personalization’s effects are not entirely 
straightforward highlights the need to explicate its functioning in different contexts, to 
gain insights into best management practices. Information collection strategies largely 
determine the personalization process, so we investigate how such strategies affect 
customers’ reactions to personalized advertisements.  
 
PRESTUDY 2 
 In early January 2013, the Dutch government began enforcing its “cookie 
law,” which obliged all websites to inform visitors of their cookie usage policies and 
receive express permission (DutchNews.nl 2013). Online visitors suddenly confronted 
evidence of the extent to which their information was being collected, similar to the 
effects of receiving a highly personalized advertisement. Therefore, reactions to the 
enforcement of the cookie law might mimic the reactions to the recognition of covert 
information collection. Accordingly, we acquired the CTR for a personalized 
advertising campaign run by a Dutch financial services provider over the course of a 
year. Midway through the campaign, the government began enforcing the cookie law, 
which created a natural comparison of CTR before and after enforcement.  
 Specifically, we modeled CTR as exponential functions of the explanatory 
variables:  
CTRt = exp [ + f(t) + It * k(t) + t], 
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where CTRt indicates the click-through rate (clicks/impressions) on day t (i = 1, 2, …, 
381);  is the intercept to be estimated; f(t) refers to the function that captures the 
baseline fluctuations, whose parameters must be estimated; It is an indicator equal to 1 
if day t occurred after the cookie law was enacted, and 0 otherwise, for which 
parameters need to be estimated; k(t) captures the incremental change in CTR due to 
the enactment of the cookie law, for which the parameters must be estimated; and t is 
a normally distributed error term. 
The results of the analysis (see Figure 4.2) show that CTR significantly drops 
from the baseline immediately after the introduction of the cookie law (–11%); after 
nine weeks, the CTR rebounds, exceeds the initial baseline, and then continues to 
increase thereafter. That is, right after the initial enforcement of the cookie law, 
customers reacted negatively to indicators that sparked their realization that their 
information was being collected without their consent. However, as time passed and 
people grew accustomed to the data collection, they apparently began to appreciate 
the transparency provided by the cookie information and increased their CTR. To 
specify the mechanism that drives this phenomenon, we embarked on a series of 
studies to test the effect when customers consider personalized advertisements, which 
may create responses similar to those prompted by the Dutch cookie law. 
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Figure 4.2  
Pre-Study 2: Percentage Change in Click-Through Rates Due to Cookie Law in the 
Netherlands 
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Design and procedure. One hundred thirty-seven participants from an online 
panel who were familiar with Facebook completed the survey. Seventeen participants 
did not meet the quality requirements set in advance (i.e., too little or excessive time 
examining the advertisement manipulation,1 too little or too much time completing 
the survey, such that the respondent appeared to have started and then left off to do 
something else), so we excluded them from the analysis. (These standards remained 
constant across all three of our main studies.) Thus, 120 respondents participated in a 
2 (less vs. more personalized advertisement)  2 (overt vs. covert information 
collection) between-subjects design. 
The participants were informed that they would complete a comprehension 
task to test their ability to recall and understand text presented in two newspaper 
articles. The first article contained the information collection manipulation; the 
second was a filler article. After reading each article, the respondents answered three 
filler questions that tested their comprehension. The varying last paragraph in the first 
article served to manipulate the study conditions (see Appendix 8): Respondents in 
the overt condition read that Facebook users were aware that Facebook used their data 
to create personalized advertisements; respondents in the covert condition read that 
Facebook users were unaware of this usage. Next, we told the respondents that they 
would be participating in a different study, in which they would imagine that they 
needed a car loan to purchase a new car and therefore sent a message to a friend 
through Facebook to ask for information about car loans (see Appendix 9). The 
scenario explained that after sending the message, they would be redirected to 
Facebook’s homepage. This page contained an advertisement either slightly (less 
                                                          
1
 A prestudy with 108 students in a laboratory setting established the minimum (11.20 sec) and 
maximum (29.05 sec) time needed to examine the manipulation containing the advertisement. 
 20 
personalized) or closely (more personalized) related to the scenario (see Appendix 
10). 
Measures. After reviewing the advertisement, participants responded to a 
click-through intention measure and a five-item perceived vulnerability measure, both 
on seven-point Likert scales (“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”). A single item 
assessed click-through intentions: “I would like to click on the advertisement to get 
further information.” Perceived vulnerability was measured using a multi-item, self-
reported scale, which we developed for this study (see Appendix 11) using the 
suggested procedures for multi-item scale development (Netemeyer, Bearden, and 
Sharma 2003). Respondents indicated the extent to which the advertisement made 
them feel “exposed,” “unprotected,” “susceptible,” “unsafe,” and “vulnerable” (α = 
.88).  
Results 
Manipulation check. Participants completed four items (Dijkstra 2005) to 
indicate the level of personalization in the advertisement (“This advertisement is 
directed to me personally”; “I recognize my personal situation in this advertisement”; 
“This advertisement takes into account the problem I faced”; “This advertisement 
takes into account my personal situation”; α = .93). They identified the more 
personalized condition as significantly more personalized than the less personalized 
version (Mless = 4.32, Mmore = 5.00; t(118) = -2.53, p = .013). Respondents in the overt 
condition also agreed more strongly with the statements, “Facebook users grant 
Facebook access to their personal information” (Movert = 5.84, Mcovert = 4.69; t(118) = 
-4.01, p < .001) and “Facebook users are aware that information about them is 
collected” (Movert = 5.34, Mcovert = 3.34; t(118) = -6.85, p < .001). 
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Click-through intentions. We validated our prediction using a between-
subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) with click-through intentions as the 
dependent variable and personalization, information collection, and their interactions 
as the independent variables. The main effect of personalization was significant 
(F(1,116) = 7.79, p = .006), but that of information collection was not (F(1,116) = 
1.87, p = .174). As Figure 4.3 shows, the personalization  information collection 
interaction effect on click-through intentions was significant (F(1,116) = 4.64, p = 
.033), in support of H1. Follow-up contrasts revealed no difference in click-through 
intentions when respondents in the covert manipulation received a more rather than 
less personalized advertisement (Mless = 2.94, Mmore = 3.16; F(1,116) = .22, p = .641). 
However, when respondents in the overt manipulation viewed a more personalized 
advertisement, they reported greater click-through intentions (Mless = 2.67, Mmore = 
4.38; F(1,116) = 11.44, p = .001). Thus, the more personalized advertisement in the 
overt condition increased click-through intentions, but in the covert condition, we 
found no changes. 
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Figure 4.3  
Study 1: Effects of Information Collection with Less and More Personalization on 
Click-Through Intentions 
 
 Perceived vulnerability. To examine respondents’ perceived vulnerability, we 
used another between-subjects ANOVA, with perceived vulnerability as the 
dependent variable and personalization, information collection, and their interactions 
as the independent variables. Neither main effect, of personalization (F(1,116) = 1.92, 
p = .168) or information collection (F(1,116) =  .01, p = .946), was significant. 
However, Figure 4.4 reveals a significant personalization  information collection 
interaction effect on perceived vulnerability (F(1,116) = 5.88, p = .017), in support of 
H2. Respondents in the covert condition perceived more vulnerability in the more 
personalized condition (Mless = 3.66, Mmore = 4.62; F(1,116) = 7.80, p = .006), 
whereas respondents in the overt condition perceived no difference in vulnerability 
(Mless = 4.25, Mmore = 3.99; F(1,116) = .50, p = .479).2 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 A two-cell post-control condition resulted in no significant differences for the covert conditions 
pertaining to either click-through intentions or vulnerability.  
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Figure 4.4 
Study 1: Effects of Information Collection with Less and More Personalization on 
Perceived Vulnerability 
  
Mediation. To determine if perceived vulnerability mediated the effect of the 
personalization  information collection interaction on click-through intentions 
(Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt, 2005; Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007), we ran three 
regression models. First, the regression with click-through intentions as the dependent 
variable and personalization, information collection, and their interaction as the 
independent variables demonstrated a significant personalization  information 
collection interaction effect on click-through intentions (β = .37, t(116) = 2.15, p = 
.033). Second, a regression with perceived vulnerability as the dependent variable and 
the same independent variables indicated a significant personalization  information 
collection interaction effect, this time on perceived vulnerability (β = -.31, t(116) = -
2.42, p = .017). Third, adding perceived vulnerability and the interaction between 
perceived vulnerability and information collection to the first model revealed a 
significant effect of perceived vulnerability on click-through intentions (β = -.36, 
t(114) = -2.82, p = .006). This regression also showed that the interaction between 
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personalization and information collection was no longer significant (β = .25, t(114) = 
1.45, p = .150). The magnitude of the personalization  information collection 
interaction decreased from β = .37 (t(116) = 2.15, p = .033) to β = .25 (t(114) = 1.45, 
p = .150). The conditional indirect effects (Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007) 
confirmed the mediating role of perceived vulnerability for the covert condition (z = -
2.00, p = .045) but not for the overt condition (z = .66, p = .510). Thus, vulnerability 
mediated the effects of personalization and information collection on click-through 
intentions, and participants in the covert condition expressed lower click-through 
intentions because they felt vulnerable,3 as we summarize in Figure 4.5. 
Figure 4.5 
Study 1: Mediated Moderation Model 
 
Discussion 
 These results provide evidence of the personalization paradox. In some 
conditions, personalization leads to greater click-through intentions; specifically, and 
consistent with our prediction, more personalization increases click-through intentions 
when firms overtly collect consumer data to provide personalized services. When 
                                                          
3
 We conducted an additional study (n = 39) to examine the effects of a cognitive response measure 
(i.e., privacy) along with the affective response (i.e., vulnerability). All participants saw the covert 
manipulation but were randomly assigned to view either the less or more personalized advertisement. 
In addition, the order of the vulnerability and privacy measures were randomized, to avoid order 
effects. The privacy measure came from Tolchinski et al. (1981; α = .816). The results were 
substantially the same, with no significant differences between the less and more personalized 
advertisements for click-through intentions (p = .507), as well as no differences for privacy (p = .298), 
but a significant difference for vulnerability (p = .043, one-tailed).  
Personalization 
Perceived 
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Click-through 
intentions 
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firms covertly collect data though, consumers feel more vulnerable when they realize 
their information has been collected without their permission, which decreases their 
click-through intentions. Because decreasing this sense of vulnerability can increase 
the effectiveness of personalized advertising, we next consider how retailers might 
establish trust as a means to counter the negative effects. 
 
STUDY 2 
The credibility of a website that contains an advertisement strongly influences 
that advertisement’s effectiveness, by determining consumers’ perceptions of its value 
(Aaker and Brown 1972), their attitudes toward the advertisement, and their 
behavioral intentions (click-through, purchase) (Choi and Rifon 2002; Shamdasani, 
Stanaland, and Tan 2001). Trust is particularly vital for managing situations that 
involve vulnerability and potential transactions (Gupta, Yadav, and Varadarajan 
2009). Because trust transfers from a website to the advertisements it hosts (Stewart 
2003), the setting should influence the effectiveness of a personalized advertisement; 
McCann Worldwide (2011) cites Facebook as among the least trusted online brands 
though. In Study 2, to test the prediction that personalized advertisements decrease 
click-through intentions when firms engage in covert data collection if the 
advertisement appears on a less trustworthy website, we use the popular CNN news 
website as a more trustworthy site and Facebook as the less trustworthy version. The 
mediation effects of vulnerability should emerge among participants who view an 
advertisement on Facebook but not for those who view the same advertisement on 
CNN.  
Method 
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Design and procedure. Two hundred fifty-one participants from an online 
panel who were familiar with Facebook participated in a 2 (less vs. more personalized 
advertisement)  2 (overt vs. covert information collection)  2 (Facebook vs. CNN) 
between-subjects design. We used a screening procedure to test their attention and 
motivation: Participants answered an open-ended question by indicating which 
website featured the advertisement, and anyone who provided incorrect responses was 
excluded (n = 25). Twenty-seven participants did not meet the preset qualifications 
and were removed from the analysis, and five participants were excluded because 
they admitted they did not read the articles. Thus, 194 participants were included in 
the analysis. 
The procedure was similar to that for Study 1: Respondents read two articles, 
the first of which contained the information collection manipulation. Then they 
imagined themselves in a car-buying scenario and viewed an advertisement that 
related either slightly or closely to the scenario. In addition, the advertisement 
appeared on either Facebook’s or CNN’s website (see Appendix 12). 
Measures. We measured click-through intentions with a single item, “I would 
like to click on the advertisement to get further information,” using a seven-point 
Likert scale (“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”). Then we asked participants to 
respond to the five-item vulnerability measure from Study 1 ( = .93). 
Results  
Manipulation check. Respondents completed the four items (α = .90) related to 
how personalized they considered the advertisement and the two questions about 
Facebook users’ awareness of and consent to information collection. The 
manipulations again worked as intended, according to the comparisons of more versus 
less personalized advertisements (Mless = 4.25, Mmore = 5.83; t(192) = -10.07, p < 
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.001) and overt versus covert conditions (awareness Movert = 5.26, Mcovert = 3.43; 
t(192) = -7.59, p < .001; consent Movert = 5.99, Mcovert = 4.54; t(192) = -6.96, p < 
.001). We also asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they trusted 
Facebook and CNN, using a semantic differential measure (“untrustworthy–
trustworthy”). A paired samples t-test revealed that CNN was significantly more 
trustworthy than Facebook (MFacebook = 4.08, MCNN = 4.57; t(193) = -3.96, p < .001). 
Click-through intentions. A between-subjects ANOVA with personalization, 
information collection, context, and their interactions as independent variables and 
click-through intentions as the dependent variable revealed a significant main effect 
for personalization (F(1,186) = 31.95, p <  .001) but no significant main effect for 
information collection (F(1,186) = 1.01, p = .315) or context (F(1,186) = 1.69, p = 
.196). The two-way interaction between personalization and information collection 
was marginally significant (F(1,186) = 3.29, p = .071), whereas the two-way 
interactions between context and personalization (F(1,186) = .32, p = .572) and 
context and information collection (F(1,186) = .04, p = .835) were both insignificant. 
The three-way interaction of the independent variables also was not significant 
(F(1,186) = 1.18, p = .278). However, analyzing each context independently, we 
found that participants displayed lower click-through intentions when highly 
personalized advertisements, collected covertly, appeared on the less trustworthy 
website compared with the more trustworthy one.4 Even though the three-way 
                                                          
4
 Among respondents who viewed the advertisement on Facebook, we found a significant interaction 
between personalization and information collection (F(1,92) = 4.25, p = .042), in support of H1. Click-
through intentions among participants in the covert condition remained the same, regardless of the 
level of personalization (Mless = 2.48, Mmore = 3.05; F(1,92) = 1.13, p = .290). In contrast, in the overt 
condition, participants reported greater intentions for a more personalized advertisement (Mless = 2.04, 
Mmore = 4.12; F(1,92) = 17.16, p < .001), as we show in Figure 6, Panel b. When respondents viewed 
the advertisement on CNN, the interaction effect of personalization and information collection was not 
significant (F(1,94) = .263, p = .609). Participants in both the covert (Mless = 2.44, Mmore = 3.87; 
F(1,94) = 8.55, p = .004) and overt (Mless = 2.46, Mmore = 4.26; F(1,94) = 10.64, p = .002) conditions 
noted significantly higher click-through intentions in the more versus less personalized condition. In 
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interaction was not significant, it did not negate the possibility of finding indirect 
effects through perceived vulnerability (Hayes 2009). Therefore, we explored the 
mediating role of vulnerability on the relationship between the interaction and click-
through intentions. 
Mediation. To understand how perceived vulnerability affects click-through 
intentions in the three-way relationship of personalization, information collection, and 
context, we conducted a mediation analysis and tested for indirect effects by 
bootstrapping with 1000 draws using the PROCESS Model 11 (Hayes 2013). We thus 
confirmed an indirect effect of personalization, through perceived vulnerability, when 
participants belonged to the covert condition and saw a personalized advertisement on 
Facebook (β = -.20), for which the 95% confidence interval (CI) excluded zero (-.45,-
.04); the same effect did not emerge for CNN (β = -.03), and the 95% CI included 
zero (-.18,.10). For participants in the overt condition, perceived vulnerability did not 
mediate the influence for either Facebook (β = .01; 95% CI (-.13,.19)) or CNN (β = -
.02; 95% CI (-.21,.16)). Therefore, when firms covertly collect data and present 
highly personalized advertisements, customers feel vulnerable (see Figure 4.6, Panel 
a) and express lower click-through intentions (Figure 4.6, Panel b) if the 
advertisements appear on an untrustworthy website but not if they show up on a 
trustworthy website, in support of H3.   
  
                                                          
the more personalized condition, we found no differences across the overt and covert conditions (Movert 
= 4.26; Mcovert = 3.87; F(1,94) = .56, p = .455). 
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Figure 4.6  
Study 2: Effects of Information Collection and Personalization in Different Contexts  
 
a. Perceived Vulnerability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Click-Through Intentions 
 
 
Discussion 
 Study 2 pertains to the differential effects of the medium of an advertisement. 
We find that the credibility of the website can mitigate the negative effects of covert 
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data collection, in that the results persisted for respondents viewing an advertisement 
on Facebook, whereas people who viewed the advertisement on CNN—a more 
trustworthy website—indicated different click-through intentions. If they were 
exposed to covert information collection, respondents indicated higher click-through 
intentions for the more personalized advertisement on the trustworthy site, where they 
did not feel vulnerable. But Facebook attracts approximately 66% of the U.S. 
population (Nielson 2013), and retailers prefer to reach this vast market, so other 
strategies are needed to offset the vulnerability effect.  
 
STUDY 3 
In response to increasing pressures regarding industry data collection 
practices, the U.K. Internet Advertising Bureau introduced a self-regulatory program 
that uses icons to inform users about data collection and usage practices associated 
with each advertisement, as well as an opt-out mechanism (Internet Advertising 
Bureau UK 2011). Firms appear to consider this icon an effective means to prevent 
government regulations, yet to the best of our knowledge, no research has tested its 
effectiveness empirically. Information icons can signal benevolence and integrity 
beliefs (Schlosser, White, and Lloyd 2006), two key elements of trust, so we posit that 
they also might offset the negative effects of covert data collections. 
Method 
Design and procedure. One hundred forty participants from an online panel 
who were familiar with Facebook completed the survey. Seventeen respondents did 
not meet the preset requirements, leaving a sample of 123 participants in the 2 (overt 
vs. covert information collection)  2 (icon present vs. absent) between-subjects 
design. The procedure was similar to that for Study 1: Respondents read two 
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newspaper articles, the first of which contained the information collection 
manipulation, and then imagined themselves in a car-buying scenario before receiving 
a highly personalized advertisement. This advertisement contained either no icon or 
an icon that specified about how their data would be collected, provided an 
opportunity to learn more about the policies, and offered opt-out choices (Appendix 
13).  
Measures. We used a seven-point Likert scale (“strongly agree” to “strongly 
disagree”) to measure click-through intentions with a single item: “I would like to 
click on the advertisement to get further information.”  
Results 
 Manipulation check. The manipulations were successful. Respondents in the 
overt condition agreed more strongly that Facebook users knew about information 
collection (Movert = 5.06, Mcovert = 3.32; t(119) = -5.13, p < .001; two participants did 
not complete the manipulation checks) and provided consent (Movert = 6.08, Mcovert = 
4.70; t(119) = -4.66, p < .001), and respondents in the icon condition agreed more 
with the statement, “The ad directed me to more information about Facebook’s data 
use policies” (Micon = 4.47, Mno_icon = 2.59; t(119) = -5.69, p < .001).  
 Click-through intentions. A between-subjects ANOVA featured information 
collection, icons, and their interaction as independent variables and click-through 
intentions as the dependent variable. There were no significant main effects but a 
significant interaction effect (F(1,119) = 4.75, p = .031; see Figure 4.7). In line with 
our previous findings, paired contrasts revealed that respondents exposed to the covert 
(vs. overt) manipulation had significantly lower click-through intentions when they 
did not see an information icon (Movert = 4.00, Mcovert = 2.96; F(1,119) = 5.48, p = 
.021). However, when respondents were presented with an information icon, the 
 32 
differences in click-through intentions between the overt and covert conditions 
became insignificant (Movert = 3.43, Mcovert = 3.77; F(1,119) = .58, p = .448), in 
support of H4. Additional contrasts revealed that respondents in the covert condition 
who received the information icon expressed significantly higher click-through 
intentions, at a 10% significance level (Micon = 3.77, Mno_icon = 2.96; F(1,119) = 3.08, 
p = .082). We found no differences between respondents in the overt condition who 
received or did not receive the information icon (Micon = 3.43, Mno_icon = 4.00; 
F(1,119) = 1.73, p = .190).  
Figure 4.7  
Study 3: Effects of Information Collection in the Presence or Absence of an Icon on 
Click-Through Intentions 
  
Discussion 
 The findings support the conjecture that when firms covertly collect data from 
customers and use the information to provide highly personalized advertising, it has 
negative consequences, such as lower click-through intentions. However, if firms take 
the initiative to inform customers about their data collection procedures, this negative 
effect disappears, likely because proactive information provision signals the firms’ 
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benevolence and reliability (Kim and Kim 2011), increases trust, and thus minimizes 
the negative effects of covert data collection. That is, firms can mitigate the negative 
effects of their covert data collection strategies by providing information and control 
to users at the moment the personalized advertisement appears.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
With this research, we respond to calls for more empirical generalizations that 
provide a better understanding of personalization strategies (Grewal et al. 2011). 
Consistent with prior research (Tam and Ho 2006), we demonstrate that 
personalization leads to greater click-through intentions—when firms practice overt 
information collection strategies. When firms practice covert strategies, click-through 
intentions do not change (Studies 1–2), because respondents who were previously 
unaware of the information collection felt more vulnerable in the face of a highly 
personalized advertisement. These findings shed light on the personalization paradox 
and explain why personalization is not always effective. We also demonstrate that the 
outcomes vary, depending on the credibility of the website on which advertisements 
appear (Study 2) and the presence of trust-building cues (Study 3).  
Implications for Theory  
This study contributes to extant research in three main ways. First, we 
examine the interaction between information collection and its personalization uses. 
Prior research offers opposing views of personalization effectiveness (Tam and Ho 
2006; White et al. 2008); our field test, secondary data, and main study results help 
reconcile the debate. When firms openly inform their customers that data collection 
has taken place, customers find the self-referential and relevant content of the 
personalized advertisements more useful, so their behavioral intentions improve (Tam 
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and Ho 2006). When consumers are not informed though, customers reject the 
personalized content and exhibit lower behavioral intentions (White et al. 2008). Even 
if the firm only informs the customer about its information collection practices as the 
consumer views the advertisement, the negative reaction disappears. Thus, customer 
awareness and its accompanying ad hoc consent have central influences on 
personalization effectiveness.  
Second, we show that rejections of personalized services often stem from 
feelings of vulnerability, which arise when consumers confront a personalized cue. 
Previous research has relied predominantly on reactance theory to explain this 
phenomenon (Tucker 2014; White et al. 2008), thus ignoring affective responses 
(Tucker 2012). By applying the theory of psychological ownership, we clarify the 
influence of an affective vulnerability experience and test its mediating effect. The 
results reveal mediation, in support of the robustness of these outcomes. Moreover, in 
line with research on psychological ownership (Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks 2001), we 
show that ensuring a consumer’s right to information and voice in pertinent decisions 
significantly reduces feelings of vulnerability. This empirical demonstration of 
vulnerability and its ramifications for personalization strategies extends research on 
personalization and psychological ownership. Specifically, our findings reveal a 
central role of vulnerability—which we operationalize with a new scale—in 
explaining backlash due to personalization. We also offer an initial empirical 
investigation of the effects of affective consumer responses on personalized services 
in social networks.  
 Third, we test the impact of two trust-building strategies that may offset the 
experience of vulnerability. Faced with information asymmetry, customers rely on 
trust heuristics to evaluate personalized advertisements (Kim and Kim 2011), so trust-
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building strategies can counteract the negative effects of covert data collection. If the 
personalized advertisement appears in a credible context or incorporates information 
icons that signal trustworthiness, consumers tend to assume they can trust the source.  
Implications for Retailers 
The National Retail Federation attributes the growth of online retail sales to 
retailers’ increased ability to use customer information to deliver relevant, targeted 
marketing. In addition to its theoretical implications, our study offers valuable 
insights for firms engaging in such online personalization. Retailers, as the most 
active group using such advertising strategies, should recognize that personalization is 
not always effective and strategically vary their personalization efforts by carefully 
selecting which pieces of information to use. For example, firms might rely on 
information that is generally relevant to a customer but not overly or personally 
targeted, particularly if they have gathered this latter information from online social 
network communications. The firms should carefully assess the level of information 
sensitivity and how closely that information ties to each consumer’s identity. Both 
elements likely determine consumer acceptance of a personalization strategy.  
We also recommend transparency about when and how consumer data is being 
collected. Increased media attention and the spread of personalization practices mean 
that consumers are increasingly aware that firms collect their information, online and 
offline. When they receive personalized advertising, these consumers likely express 
more skepticism toward the retailer, especially if it cites information they did not 
explicitly consent to provide. Consumers believe that they own such personal 
information, so if retailers gain access to it, they must inform customers about their 
data collection strategies and seek implied consent, in the form of consumers’ 
continued usage. Customers must be conscious of this decision, which implies that 
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retailers should be proactive in providing comprehensible, visible notifications of 
their information collection practices.  
Despite the importance of such information policies, it is difficult to 
implement proactive communications in all circumstances and across the various 
complex relationships on the Web (e.g., among online publishers, retailers, and data 
brokers). For targeted advertising in social media, firms thus might benefit from 
placements on trustworthy websites or from the use of an icon, similar to the one in 
Study 3, included directly in the advertisements. The icons have been advocated by 
industry associations as a best practice solution (Internet Advertising Bureau UK 
2011) but not universally implemented yet. Such actions help build trust though, 
which has a direct correlation with recommendation intentions, loyalty, and share of 
wallet (IBM Institute for Business Value 2012). Our findings indicate the need for 
wider adoption; such tools can offset negative reactions to personalized advertising, 
enhance website credibility, and make personalized advertising more acceptable.  
Limitations and Avenues for Further Research 
The limitations of this study stem largely from the experimental context we 
used to test our predictions. First, respondents considered a hypothetical buying 
scenario. Although the scenario resembled reality, consumer decision making in the 
real world may differ. Second, it is difficult to say whether the results generalize to 
other contexts, especially those in which the personalization implies different levels 
of information sensitivity (Mothersbaugh et al. 2012). Moreover, online publishers 
other than Facebook could produce different results. Further research should address 
these generalization issues. 
Additional research also could delve into customer responses to online and 
offline personalization strategies. Offline data collection typically occurs when the 
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customer tenders a physical loyalty card; online data collection is less transparent, and 
the nature of online personalization enables retailers to react to the provided 
information in real time (Dekimpe et al. 2011), with minimal time between data 
collection and use. These features could affect how customers react to distinct online 
and offline personalization strategies, which is an interesting avenue for research. As 
technological innovations constantly push the acceptable boundaries of information 
collection, it also would be worthwhile to conduct a longitudinal study to gain 
insights into any changes in what customers define as acceptable. 
More research also could explicate the concept of psychological ownership 
and its influence over consumer behavior. Shu and Peck (2011) argue that this theory 
can explain many endowment effects documented in prior literature, yet related 
research remains limited. It would be helpful to determine which personality traits or 
demographic characteristics might correlate with psychological ownership. We also 
call for research into potential variations in ownership perceptions toward personal 
information that cannot be controlled, such as age, gender, and health, compared with 
that which can be controlled, such as an address, level of education, or financial 
information. 
Finally, the ever-increasing value of advertising through social media ($3.8 
billion in 2011; Kharif 2012) suggests the need for more investigations of related 
issues. Research might consider the role of other network members and their potential 
influence on the effectiveness of advertising in social media networks. As technology 
advances, customers can exchange information more easily in real time; a user 
viewing an advertisement on a social media channel thus may be simultaneously 
interacting with others. Does this dynamic environment affect advertising success? 
The size of a network and the strength of the ties within that network also could 
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influence this emerging phenomenon. 
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